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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
PETITION FOR REHEARING

TAMO MAYNARD and
DAVID FISCHER,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Docket No. 95-0204
vs.
THOMAS WHARTON, JR. and
WILLIAM ROBERTS,
Defendants/Appellees.
ooOoo
Come Now Appellants, Tamo Maynard and David Fischer, and
petition this Honorable Court pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of
Appellate

Procedure, for an order granting rehearing of

their

appeal in the above matter on the grounds that the court failed to
address the issue of waiver in its Opinion.
In the Opinion dated February 23, 1996, a copy of which is
attached, the court addressed only two issues, the merger doctrine
and the trial court's award of attorney's fees under the Earnest
Money Agreement.

In the Opinion, the court analyzed and rejected

the Plaintiffs' claims that the closing instructions avoided the
doctrine of merger.

In so doing, the court completely failed to

consider other issues raised by the Appellants, both below and
C:\D\113 02\REHEARIN.PET
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before this Court, in particular, the application of the doctrine
of waiver.
Waiver

was

raised

in

the

trial

court

on page

6 of

the

Appellants' memorandum opposing the Appellees' motion for summary
judgment.

There, the Appellants argued that the Appellees had

waived any claim that merger doctrine applied to.

cited Soter's

Inc.

v. Deseret

Savings

and Loan,

The Appellants

857 P. 2d 935 (Utah

1993) . The trial court failed to consider the doctrine of waiver,
and the Appellants made this issue one of the primary points of
their Brief on Appeal.
At page 10-12 of their Brief on Appeal, the Appellants argued,
"Facts Remain on the Issue of Waiver."

There they argued that

Appellees' closing in the face of the closing instructions and
Appellees' conceded understanding that Appellants would not have
closed without reserving their rights constituted waiver of those
rights by Appellees.
In addition to having been argued in the Appellants' primary
Brief, waiver was also argued in their Reply Brief at pages 7-8.
It is clear that the rights of the Appellees may be waived
though they did not sign a document which caused them to be waived.
The general policy in Utah on this issue is described at Utah Code
Ann. §70A-2-209.

Relevant portions of that section of the Code

read:
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification
or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be
otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between
C:\D\11302\REHEARIN.PET
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merchants such requirement on a form supplied by the
merchant must be separately signed by the other party.
Subparagraph 4 of that section of the Code reads:
(4) Although
an
attempt
at
modification
rescission
does
not
satisfy
the
requirements
Subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
Paragraph

5

of

that

section

of

the

Code

or
of

describes

the

situation in this case:
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an
executory portion of the contract may retract the waiver
by reasonable notification received by the other party
that strict performance will be required of any term
waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of
a material change of position in reliance on the waiver.
While the UCC may not be directly applicable to this case, it
is cited to show the public policy which has been adopted in Utah.
Case law supports the position of the UCC.

In Cheney

v. Rucker,

14

Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (Utah 1963), the court said:
It is a well established rule of law that parties to
a written contract may modify, waive, or make new
terms . . . .
And this was held to be so notwithstanding terms in
that contract designed to hamper such freedom.
Cheney

v.

Rucker

real property.

was a suit for commissions in arranging a trade of
The agreement in Cheney

required to be in writing.
shows
though

agreement

a written modification

is required,

frauds, to be in writing.
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was statutorily

See Utah Code Ann. §25-5-4(5).

rights may be waived without
the underlying

v. Rucker
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by the

This
even

statute

of

In Provo

City

Corp.

v.

Nielson

Scott

Co.,

603 P.2d 803, 806,

(Utah 1979), where the contract at issue was for redevelopment of
real property, the court also held:
. . . It is true that parties to a written contract may
modify, waive, or make new contractual terms, even if the
contract itself contains a provision to the contrary.
Similarly, in White

v.

Fox,

665 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1983),

the court said:
. . . the respondents argue that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on waiver because any waiver of the
listing agreement must comply with the statute of frauds.
The respondents cite several cases in support of the
general rule that any modification of a contract that is
within the statute of frauds must also comply with the
statute of frauds.
[citation omitted]
However, with
respect to oral modification of written contracts within
the statute of frauds, this Court has stated:
'If a
party has changed his position by performing an oral
modification so that it would be inequitable to permit
the other party to found a claim upon the original
agreement as unmodified or defeat the former's claim by
setting up a defense that performance was not according
to the written contract, after he has induced or
consented to the former going forward, the modified
agreement should be held valid.'
The right to rely upon the doctrine of merger is a right which
may be waived.

Virtually all of the reported cases in which Utah's

watershed case on waiver, Soter's
and

Loan,

857 P. 2d 935

Inc.

(Utah 1994), Pasker

P.2d
Greater

872

C & T Inc.

Gould

Ames

City

C:\D\113 02\REHEARIN.PET

Co.,

v.

& Weaver,

(Utah App. 1994), and United

Park

Deseret

Federal

Savings

(Utah 1993) is cited pertain to rights

granted under written contracts.
623

v.

Park

Koroulis,
Inc.

v.

City

Mines

870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993).

4

888 P. 2d
Morse,
Co.

887
v.

The doctrine of waiver is applicable to the case at bar.

The

doctrine was raised in the trial court and raised on appeal, but
this Court failed to consider that issue on appeal.
should

grant

Appellants' motion

for rehearing,

The court

reconsider

its

decision in light of the Appellees' waiver and reverse the trial
court on the grounds that factual issues remain as to whether or
not the Appellees waived their right to rely upon the contract and
the doctrine of merger.
DATED this f( '

day of March, 1996

Robert H. Wile
Attorney for Appellants

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I certify that I m^il^d two copies of the foregoing Petition
for Rehearing on this fa Zn^daY of March, 1996 to the offices of:
David T. Aagard, Esq.
1245 East Brickyard Road #530
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

Robert H. Wilde
Attorney for Appellants
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The doctrine of waiver is applicable to the case at bar.

The

doctrine was raised in the trial court and raised on appeal, but
this Court failed to consider that issue on appeal.
should grant Appellants' motion

for rehearing,

The court

reconsider

its

decision in light of the Appellees' waiver and reverse the trial
court on the grounds that factual issues remain as to whether or
not the Appellees waived their right to rely upon the contract and
the doctrine of merged.
DATED this

day of March, 1996.

Robert
Attorney for Appev3Tlants

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I certify that I maile^L two copies of the foregoing Petition
for Rehearing for this {firr) day of March, 1996 to the offices of:
David T. Aagard, Esq.
1245 East Brickyard Road #530
Salt Lake City, UT .84106

.ana Romney
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FILED
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

FEB 2 3 1996
COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo
OPINION
(For Official Publication)

Tamo Maynard and David
Fischer,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No. 950204-CA
v.
F I L E D
(February 23, 1996)

Thomas Wharton, Jr.; and
William Roberts,
Defendants and Appellees.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable David S. Young
Attorneys:

Robert H. Wilde and Kelly DeHill, Midvale, for
Appellants
David T. Aagard and Fred G. Biesinger, Salt Lake
City, for Appellees

Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Jackson.
JACKSON, Judge:
Tamo Maynard and David Fischer (buyers) appeal the trial
court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their complaint
against Thomas Wharton, Jr. and William Roberts (sellers).
Buyers alleged breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation,
and fraud arising from their purchase of real estate from
sellers. Buyers also appeal the trial court's order awarding
attorney fees to sellers. We affirm in part and reverse in part,
FACTS
Buyers negotiated to purchase from sellers approximately
twenty-five acres of undeveloped property in Bluffdale, Utah.
Sellers previously had obtained a preliminary survey and plat
that divided the parcel into nineteen lots. The preliminary plat
erroneously included a parcel slightly over one acre--Lot 15-that sellers did not own. During their negotiations, sellers
gave buyers a copy of the erroneous preliminary plat. Buyers

tendered an earnest money agreement that described the property
as follows: "25 acre parcel Sidwell #33-09-451-004 as per
listing #307269." One of several subsequent addenda to the
earnest money agreement described a portion of the property as
"lots 10 through 15," referring to the erroneous preliminary
plat.
Almost two months after buyers tendered the earnest money
agreement, sellers faxed to buyers a copy of sellers' warranty
deed to the property. That deed's metes and bounds description
included an explicit exception describing the area erroneously
labeled Lot 15. Negotiations continued for another two months,
during which time both sellers and buyers continued to believe
Lot 15 was included in the twenty-five acre parcel. Shortly
before closing, buyers learned that sellers did not hold title to
the parcel labeled Lot 15 on the preliminary plat. Buyers
contacted sellers, who initially insisted they owned Lot 15.
However, six days before closing, sellers notified buyers that
sellers in fact did not own Lot 15 and that sellers could not
convey Lot 15 to buyers.1
Buyers and sellers met at the title company but could not
resolve the issue of Lot 15. Buyers and sellers agreed to meet
again and close the sale. At the closing, buyers hand delivered
a short memo addressed to sellers and the title company. The
memo's reference line stated: "Instructions for closing of
property at 2700 West 150000 South." Those "Closing
Instructions" stated:
Enclosed herewith are our checks totaling
$48,892.44 representing the down payment
referenced in the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement dated June 14, 1993. Guardian
Title Company is authorized to disburse these
funds and Mr. Wharton and Mr. Roberts are
authorized to accept them with the
understanding that we are reserving our
rights to dispute whether the transaction
includes and we were sold the property
identified as lot 15 on the preliminary plat
and the right to claim damages and fees under
paragraph "N" of the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement. If this reservation is not
acceptable the checks are to be returned to
us and the closing is not to proceed.
1. Sellers assert they did not deliberately mislead buyers.
Sellers attribute the mistake in the preliminary plat to a
surveyor error of which sellers were ignorant.

950204-CA
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Neither buyers nor sellers signed the "Closing Instructions."
The parties proceeded with the closing and signed a warranty
deed, trust deed, trust deed note, and associated closing
documents. None of those closing documents referred to or
incorporated the "Closing Instructions" that buyers had delivered
to sellers and the title company. Buyers recorded the warranty
deed and took possession of the property.
Approximately one month after the closing, buyers filed the
instant suit, alleging breach of contract, negligent
misrepresentation, and fraud. Sellers moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the earnest money agreement's abrogation
clause and the doctrine of merger precluded buyers from
maintaining a cause of action based on an earnest money agreement
after buyers accepted the warranty deed. The trial court granted
sellers' motion. Sellers then moved for attorney fees and costs,
relying on a provision of the earnest money agreement regarding
default and attorney fees. The trial court granted sellers*
motion for fees and costs and entered a judgment against buyers.
Buyers appealed.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, buyers argue that issues of material fact
surrounding their claims preclude summary judgment. Buyers also
argue that sellers are not entitled to attorney fees because
sellers did not show that buyers defaulted on the earnest money
agreement. Buyers' appeal thus presents two issues for our
review: first, whether the doctrine of merger applies and
entitles sellers to summary judgment; and second, whether sellers
may recover attorney fees under the earnest money agreement.
Both issues present a question of law that we review for
correctness, affording no particular deference to the trial
court. £££ Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah
1988) (awardablity of attorney fees); Secor v. Knight. 716 P.2d
790, 792-93 (Utah 1986) (applicability of merger doctrine); see
frlSQ State v. Richardson. 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah App. 1992)
(stating "we consider the trial court's interpretation of binding
case law as presenting a question of law and review the trial
court's interpretation of that law for correctness").
MERGER DOCTRINE
It is well settled that the merger doctrine applies in Utah.
The Utah Supreme Court explained the merger doctrine as follows:

950204-CA

3

The doctrine of merger . . . is applicable
when the acts to be performed by the seller
in a contract relate only to the delivery of
title to the buyer. Execution and delivery
of a deed by the seller then usually
constitute full performance on his [or her]
part, and acceptance of the deed by the buyer
manifests his [or her] acceptance of that
performance even though the estate conveyed
may differ from that promised in the
antecedent agreement. Therefore, in such a
case, the deed is the final agreement and all
prior terms, whether written or verbal, are
extinguished and unenforceable.
Stubbs v. Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1977) (footnotes
omitted); accord, e.g.. Secor v. Knight. 716 P.2d 790, 793 (Utah
1986); Schafir v. Harriaan. 879 P.2d 1384, 1391-92 (Utah App.
1994); Embassy Group. Inc. v. Hatch. 865 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Utah
App. 1993). The doctrine of merger is "routinely applied when an
antecedent agreement contains an abrogation clause." Embassy
Group, 865 P.2d at 1371. Moreover, "a deed is tantamount to a
final real estate contract and usually abrogates a preliminary
earnest money agreement containing an abrogation clause." Id.
The abrogation clause at issue here is typical; it provides:
"Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution
and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this
Agreement." In other words, an abrogation clause is a
contractual statement of the common law doctrine of merger.
The merger doctrine has four discrete exceptions: (1) mutual
mistake in the drafting of the final documents; (2) ambiguity in
the final documents; (3) existence of rights collateral to the
contract of sale; and (4) fraud in the transaction. See Secor.
879 P.2d at 793; Embassy Group. 865 P.2d at 1371-72. In the
present case, buyers contend their "Closing Instructions"
preclude application of the merger doctrine. Buyers argue the
"Closing Instructions" memorialize the parties1 intent regarding
the sale of the twenty-five acres and thus sustain the earnest
money agreement's viability after closing. Our analysis reveals,
however, that the "Closing Instructions" do not fall within one
of the merger doctrine's four exceptions. Buyers concede the
exceptions for mutual mistake and ambiguity do not apply to the
present case. Consequently, our analysis focuses on the
collateral rights and fraud exceptions.
First, the exception for collateral rights "applies when the
seller's performance involves some act collateral to the
conveyance of title." Embassy Group. 865 P.2d at 1372. For
example, terms in an earnest money agreement requiring sellers to
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remove certain equipment from their property are collateral to
conveyance of the property; therefore, a deed does not extinguish
those terms. Stubbs. 567 P.2d at 170. " [T]he question of
whether a specific term is or is not collateral, and hence
whether the term will or will not merge into the deed, is
determined by the intent of the parties." Secor, 716 P.2d at
793. However, Utah courts need not look to the parties1 intent
on issues relating to title and encumbrances because such issues
"relate to the same subject matter as does the deed." Id.
Issues relating to title and encumbrances are central rather
than collateral to agreements for the sale of real estate.
Accordingly, buyers' reliance on the "Closing Instructions" as
evidence of the parties' intent is misplaced. Because the issue
of Lot 15 relates to conveyance of title, the parties' intent
regarding Lot 15 is irrelevant after delivery and acceptance of
the deed. The merger doctrine's collateral rights exception thus
does not apply because this case involves terms relating to
title.
Next, the exception for fraud
to avoid merger can prove by clear
the other party committed fraud in
Id. at 794. In Utah, the elements

applies when the party seeking
and convincing evidence that
the real estate transaction.
of fraud are the following:

(1) a representation; (2) concerning a
presently existing material fact; (3) which
was false; (4) which the representor either
(a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly,
knowing that he [or she] had insufficient
knowledge on which to base such
representation; (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6)
that the other party, acting reasonably and
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact
rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to
act; (9) to his [or her] injury and damage.
Duaan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980) (footnote
omitted) . Buyers admit they knew sellers could not convey Lot 15
to them at least six days before they accepted the final closing
documents. Consequently, buyers cannot establish that they acted
reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity of sellers' earlier
representations about Lot 15. Buyers thus, as a matter of law,
cannot establish fraud, and "[i]n the absence of fraud, the
merger doctrine applies." Secor, 716 P.2d at 794.
The Utah Supreme Court has described the merger doctrine as
"an admittedly harsh rule of law." Id. Nevertheless, Utah
adheres to the merger doctrine because it "preserves the

950204-CA
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integrity of the final document of conveyance and encourages the
diligence of the parties." Id. at 795 (emphasis added). Parties
to real estate transactions have a duty "to make certain that
their agreements have in fact been fully included in the final
document." Id. In the present case, buyers claim that
delivering their "Closing Instructions" to sellers and the title
company fulfilled their duty of diligence. We disagree. Parties
to real estate transactions must ensure that any agreements
involving conveyance or encumbrance of title are incorporated
into the final closing document, which is usually a warranty
deed. Buyers' "Closing Instructions" were not incorporated into
the deed that sellers tendered and buyers accepted. Accordingly,
the "Closing Instructions" have no legal significance.
In sum, parties to the sale of real estate must confirm that
all agreements relating to conveyance of title are incorporated
into the deed before they tender or accept it. Subject to
limited exceptions, the merger doctrine remains viable in Utah
and extinguishes all antecedent agreements upon delivery and
acceptance of a deed. Buyers' claims involve the conveyance of
title; therefore, the merger doctrine's exception for collateral
rights does not apply and the parties' intent is irrelevant.
Buyers admit they knew that sellers could not convey Lot 15 for
six days prior to closing; therefore, the merger doctrine's
exception for fraud does not apply. The trial court correctly
concluded the merger doctrine precludes buyers' suit and properly
granted sellers' motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we
affirm the trial court's order dismissing buyers' complaint with
prejudice.
ATTORNEY FEES UNDER EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT
In Utah, attorney fees authorized by contract are awardable
only in accordance with the explicit terms of the contract and
only to the extent permitted by the contract. Turtle Management,
Inc. v. Haggis Management. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982);
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-56
(Utah App. 1989) . Parties seeking an award of attorney fees
under a contract must establish that the contract's terms
anticipate such an award. See Loosle v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass' n, 858 P.2d 999, 1003 (Utah 1993) (concluding attorney fees
provision in trust deed and promissory note did not contemplate
attorney fees for quiet title action).
In the instant case, the only basis for attorney fees that
sellers presented to the trial court was the earnest money
agreement. Paragraph "N" of that agreement provides, in
pertinent part:
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6

Both parties agree that should either party
default in any of the covenants or agreements
herein contained, the defaulting party shall
pay all costs and expenses, including a
reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or
accrue from enforcing or terminating this
Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided
hereunder or by applicable law, whether such
remedy is pursued by filing suit or
otherwise.
This contractual provision requires those seeking an award of
attorney fees to show that the other party has defaulted on at
least one of the covenants or agreements of the earnest money
agreement. Sellers argued because buyers did not recognize the
abrogation clause's validity, buyers somehow defaulted, and
sellers were entitled to attorney fees. Our analysis reveals
buyers' nonrecognition of the abrogation clause is not a default
anticipated by paragraph "N" of the earnest money agreement.
Sellers point only to buyers' failure to recognize the
validity of the abrogation clause as evidence of the default that
entitled sellers to attorney fees. Parties to an earnest money
agreement cannot default on the abrogation clause. We reiterate:
the abrogation clause is a contractual statement of the merger
doctrine. Paragraph "0" of the earnest money agreement simply
states: "Except for express warranties made in this Agreement,
execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate
this Agreement." The provision thus establishes the earnest
money agreement's legal termination.
Sellers did not point to any express warranties, covenants,
or agreements on which buyers defaulted; therefore, sellers
cannot invoke paragraph f,N" as a basis for an award of attorney
fees. Paragraph "N" has limits; it does not award attorney fees
to prevailing parties in every suit related to the earnest money
agreement. In short, paragraph "N" does not contemplate an award
of attorney fees for sellers just because buyers sued. See Carr
v. Enoch Smith Co.. 781 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Utah App. 1989); £JL.
Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (Utah App. 1995) (holding
buyers' election of remedy under earnest money agreement was not
default that entitled sellers to attorney fees).

2. Because we conclude buyers did not establish an adequate
basis for the trial court's award of attorney fees, we do not
reach issues surrounding sufficiency of evidence for and
calculation of the award.
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In sum, attorney fees may be awarded under the instant
contract only when one party can show that the other party has
defaulted on an explicit covenant or agreement contained in the
earnest money agreement. Sellers did not establish that buyers
defaulted on any covenant or agreement and thus have no basis for
an award of attorney fees. The trial court incorrectly concluded
that buyers* failure to recognize the validity of the abrogation
clause constituted a default by buyers. Accordingly, we reverse
the trial court's award of attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
We hold the meiger doctrine precludes buyers from bringing
their claims after buyers accept and record a deed from sellers.
Buyers' "Closing Instructions" do not fall within any exception
to the merger doctrine. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's
summary judgment in favor of sellers. We further hold the
attorney fees provision of the earnest money agreement does not
permit an award of attorney fees to sellers in this case. Buyers
did not default on the earnest money agreement simply by bringing
suit against sellers. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's
award of attorney fees to sellers and vacate the judgment against
buyers.

WE CONCUR:

Gregory Jiff Orme,
Presiding Judge

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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